Asset prices, inflation and monetary control : re-inventing money as a policy tool by Spahn, Peter
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0930-8334 
 
Asset Prices, Inflation and Monetary Control 
Re-inventing Money as a Policy Tool 
 
by 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
 
Nr. 323/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Asset Prices, Inflation and Monetary Control 
Re-inventing Money as a Policy Tool 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
 
Abstract 
Low inflation on goods markets provides no reliable precondition for asset-market sta-
bility; it might even promote the emergence of bubbles because interest rates and risk 
premia appear to be low. A further factor driving asset demand is easy availability of 
credit, which in turn roots in the banking system operating in a regime of endogenous 
central-bank money. A comparison of Bundesbank and ECB policies suggests that 
credit growth can be controlled more efficiently if rising interest rates are accompanied 
by some liquidity squeeze that supports the spillover of a monetary restriction to capital 
markets. The announcement effect of a central bank Charter including the goal of finan-
cial-market stability helps to deter private agents from excessive asset trading. 
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1. Introduction  
One of the outstanding characteristics of world macroeconomics in the last two dec-
ades has been the concurrence of comparatively low inflation on goods markets and 
high volatility on asset markets, i.e. periods of asset price inflation (bubbles) followed 
by the inevitable collapse; and although types and locations of asset markets that were 
seized by speculation varied - shares, real estate, natural resources, bonds and more so-
phisticated financial instruments - observers gained the impression that the point at is-
sue was not just an accidental occurrence of a row of independent manias, but rather the 
new phenomenon of general asset price inflation. This impression was reinforced by the 
empirical finding of strong growth of liquidity, again on a world scale (Rüffer and 
Stracca 2006; Belke et al. 2008). Banking business soared; the ,originate and distribute‘ 
strategy enabled high growth rates of bank credit; and new financial instruments offered 
seemingly attractive yields for investors.  
It should not be disputed that bubbles and over-banking to a large extent resulted 
from faulty regulation and thus can be contained by smart institutional micro policies. 
But besides these supply-side measures, a macroeconomic perspective might be able to 
present a monetary policy response as well. A straightforward reaction would be to em-
bark on a restrictive policy course whenever goods or asset price inflation sets off or 
money growth figures appear to indicate that one or both types of inflation are immi-
nent. The hesitation to follow such a recommendation are motivated from two points: 
− The instability of money velocity has undermined policy strategies that tried to pre-
dict and to contain goods inflation by way of supervising and controlling a mone-
tary intermediate target.  
− True, excess money growth that does not flow into goods demand often, but not al-
ways, fuels asset price inflation. Moreover, the spillover process from the latter 
back to goods markets seems to be highly non-linear, and even uncertain with re-
spect to its sign: wealth effects of rising asset prices might strengthen consumption, 
but the more dangerous topic is the deflationary impact of bursting asset bubbles 
that works through illiquidity, insolvency and bankruptcies.  
Therefore it is reasonable to treat goods and asset-price inflation as distinct phenom-
ena (without of course denying various two-way feedback mechanisms between these 
processes). But in this case, remembering the famous Tinbergen Rule, monetary policy 
also should dispose of two independent stabilization tools that can be applied to each 
type of inflation. Accordingly, this paper explores whether central banks, besides stan-
dard interest rate policies, can use quantitative management of base money supply as an 
additional tool that should be applied in times of extreme monetary disorder. Admit-
tedly, this is an rather unusual idea because a uniform money market generally implies a 
strict price-quantity relationship so that the rate of interest and the quantity of high-
powered money cannot both be regarded as exogenous. In the current financial crises 
however, central banks have demonstrated that the provision of liquidity to some extent 
can be disentangled from the choice of the target interest rate. It has to be analyzed 
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whether this instrumental set-up is bound to a low-interest regime, or can likewise be 
applied in an anti-inflation strategy.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section argues that financial-market sta-
bility cannot be seen as a by-product of price stability; moreover, there are hints to a 
new trade-off indicating a higher risk for asset price bubbles to emerge particularly in 
periods of low inflation. The following two Sections present a comparison of the 
Bundesbank's and the ECB's way of policy making. The key point is that the former 
sometimes made use of quantitative money supply controls whereas the latter does not; 
in EMU, increases of short-term interest rates can go along with rising growth rates of 
base money. The last two Sections suggest to organize the money market as a ,floor‘ 
system that allows, to some extent, an independent employment of the interest rate and 
the money supply tool. It is suggested to use open-market sales of long-term bonds as a 
means against emerging asset price bubbles. 
2. Trade-off between Monetary and Financial Stability? 
The venerable quantity theory of money can best be understood as providing a kind 
of ,budget constraint‘ for the macro economy.1  As the notion of a budget constraint is 
indispensable in economics, it is comprehensible that many economists resist the down-
grading of monetarist components in monetary policy making (Goodhart 2007). But it 
is hard to deny that central banks all around the world succeeded to contain inflation by 
means of interest rate policies, without taking figures of monetary aggregates too seri-
ously. This does not mean, of course, that the aforementioned budget constraint no 
longer exists, rather, central banks were able to control its position by means of direct 
interest rate policies.  
The reasons for central banks' success of containing inflation are manifold. Supply 
functions are flat in the range of normal utilization rates; free trade fosters fierce compe-
tition; and wage rates are depressed on account of excess labour supply in the world 
market. Moreover, improvements in the institutional set-up and the instrumental tech-
niques of central banks have increased their reputation around the world; this contrib-
utes to stable long-term inflation expectations (hovering around the target rate of infla-
tion) so that supply functions are not prone to expectational upward shifts.2   
                                                 
1   This can easily be visualized by transforming the quantity equation into a goods demand 
function which gives a downward-sloping line in an inflation-growth diagram. 
2  A caveat should be noticed however: measurement of long-term inflation expectations via 
financial-market indicators can be biased towards target inflation rates because heavy 
doses of communication used in inflation targeting strategies might distort the informa-
tion content of asset prices. The more central banks succeed to steer market agents' be-
liefs, the less private information flows into market prices. It has thus been found that in 
inflation targeting countries long-term inflation expectations are uncoupled from actual 
inflation outcomes. „There is an intrinsic tension, which central banks cannot ignore, be-
tween their ability to manage private sector expectations and provide guidance to profes-
sional market participants, on the one hand, and their need to learn from markets, on the 
other hand“ (ECB 2009a, p. 86; cf. Morris and Shin 2005). 
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At the same time, instability of asset prices grew, more or less parallel to the Great 
Moderation of goods market inflation. The proposition that price stability is a precondi-
tion for stability on financial markets (Bordo et al. 2000) now appears in a less favour-
able light. An obvious hypothesis is that belief in the stable value of money relieves fi-
nancial assets from inflation risk and thus increases the attractiveness of financial mar-
kets as a playing field for professional (and unprofessional) investors. Lower long-term 
interest rates then produce a spillover to other asset markets. Low inflation and low in-
terest rates generally might lead market agents to take more risks (Borio and Lowe 
2002; ECB 2008a; Trichet 2008; Weber 2009). Hence, the remarkable progress in un-
derstanding, techniques and performance of goods market inflation control might invol-
untary have sown the seeds of financial-market instability. 
On a more technical level, it should not be ignored that the ,art of central banking‘ 
over the years has abandoned - for many good reasons (Bindseil 2004) - the attempts to 
exert effective quantitative control of high-powered money in the banking system. 
There were periods in some countries where monetary aggregates had been selected as 
intermediary targets, but even the ECB has downgraded money to a pure information 
variable. As a consequence, the banking system appears to operate without quantitative 
liquidity constraints - and the whole burden of controlling banking activities falls on 
price incentives, triggered by central banks' interest rate policies.  
Before the latter road is explored further, one should ask whether asset markets need 
macro control if monetary policy succeeds to stabilize the path of goods prices. Taking 
into account how much effort the economics profession has devoted to the problem of 
explaining and controlling the level of goods prices, it is curious that asset prices have 
not attracted similar attraction in the history of economic thought. True, there is a litera-
ture on speculative bubbles on single asset markets, but this is no point at issue here; it 
has also been shown that temporary investments in those markets can well be justified 
on the ground of rational portfolio choice.  
The new challenge for stabilization policy is an asset inflation spanning over the 
whole range of markets. A well known analytical approach to capture the value of over-
all wealth is Friedman's concept of permanent income that gives an estimate of personal 
or society's wealth via the discount rate. From this it follows that controlling nominal 
income also puts a constraint on asset prices. But this depends, firstly, on asset prices 
being determined by ,fundamental‘ market forces, and portfolio theory has detected 
many reasons why this anchor might loose its bearings. Secondly, the fundamental 
value of assets, particularly shares, may be uncertain after historical events or signifi-
cant structural change, e.g. the world economy's new shape after communism or the 
,new economy‘ boom. Thirdly, there may be multiple fundamental equilibria, e.g., 
prices and rents of flats in quickly developing large cities or regions; also an inflation 
targeting strategy with endogenous money leaves the level of prices (on goods and asset 
markets) undetermined.  
Taken together, except for states of long-run equilibrium, all these arguments provide 
plenty of reasons to feel concerned about the stability of asset prices. Worries are rein-
forced, if bank credits to finance new positions are easy available. After all, even if asset 
prices are governed by fundamental yield flows, a banking system acting without bind-
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ing financial constraints is prone to a bubble of excess intermediation, i.e. a pyramid of 
credit and debt contracts that might pose a severe threat for the stability of financial 
markets. Possibly, interest rate increases might keep a check upon credit expansion and 
asset prices; however, for good reasons central banks usually practise the strategy of in-
terest rate smoothing (Cobham 2003), and small-step increases are unlikely to put an 
immediate halt on an enfolding asset price bubble.  
Obviously, also asset markets need a kind of budget constraint, which however up to 
now has not been deliberately provided by monetary authorities. This does not mean 
that constraints were absent. During the gold standard, the obligation to obey to the 
principle of ,backing‘ bank money served as an anchor for both goods and asset prices. 
In fiat-money systems, formal restrictions were meant to fill the gap, but regulations 
more and more were seen as costly and thus came to be relaxed (Borio and Lowe 2002). 
Whereas the control of goods market inflation was substantially improved by institu-
tional devices (new rules for central banking), commercial banking business and finan-
cial markets were expected to run more efficiently with less regulation. In any case, fi-
nancial-market instability on a large scale is a relatively new phenomenon. Therefore 
taking a closer look on changes in the ,art of central banking‘ might detect the sources 
of the enlarged elasticity in the banks' supply of finance. 
3. The Bundesbank's Way of Policy Making: Traces of the ,Scissors 
Effect‘ 
According to an oral tradition among German economists, the saying ,keeping the 
money supply scarce‘ has been a principle of the Bundesbank's understanding of sound 
central banking already before the rise of monetarism. But it should not be neglected 
that until the break-down of Bretton Woods money creation mainly was governed by 
the foreign-exchange market. In 1974, the Bundesbank embarked on the experiment of a 
Friedmanian money supply management, but gave up soon because of high interest rate 
volatility in the money market; subsequently a variety of monetary aggregates were 
chosen as intermediate policy targets. Rated by the high number of target misses, the 
strategy was a failure, but inflation was kept firmly in check.3  
Taking a cursory look at the path of CMB (the monetary base corrected for changes 
of reserve ratios) and short-term interest rates in Germany (Figure 1), provokes a remi-
niscence to the famous ,scissors policy‘: a series of interest rate movements should be 
accompanied and accelerated by additional quantitative money supply measures (Lutz 
1936, pp. 47-8; Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 272). It appears as if the Bundesbank 
                                                 
3  Even with hindsight, it is tiresome to correct all the myths about the Bundesbank's fa-
mous money supply control. Recently, a group of renowned ECB economists including 
Otmar Issing wrote that „at the end of 1978, the potential-oriented monetary targeting 
strategy had been established and had proven its value“ (Beyer et al. 2009, p. 21). But we 
know from an evaluation of internal debates that Bundesbank officials just at that time 
were ready to skip that strategy because of permanent expansive target misses. Actually it 
was the establishment of the EMS that let the idea of monetary targeting survive because 
the bankers wanted to keep the option of an alternative policy rule if the obligation to de-
fend the exchange rate would prove to be a too-high risk for price stability (Hagen 1998). 
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had reduced the growth rate of high-powered money in each period of monetary restric-
tion. But of course, CMB reflects the overall activity in the banking sector: the demand 
for minimum reserves and notes, which in the end depends on the volume of bank 
credit. This implies that the sudden stop of CMB expansion after 1965, 1973 and 1979 
may simply show the effect of previous interest rate increases that finally managed to 
curb the banking sector's credit growth.4 But in each case, the Bundesbank actually at-
tempted to execute some ,liquidity squeeze‘ in order to strengthen the message con-
veyed by its interest rate decisions.  
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Figure 1: Growth rate (y-o-y) of CMB (monetary base corrected for changes 
of minimum-reserve requirements) and short-term interest rates in 
Germany 
− During 1964-66, when rates were rising also abroad, the Bundesbank allowed 
commercial banks to replenish transaction-induced outflows of liquidity only at 
higher interest rates; also refinancing quotas were reduced. As can be seen from the 
behaviour of the call money rate, which remained within the interest rate corridor, 
the liquidity strain felt in the money market was not extraordinary though. 
− This changed during the next episode where the call money rate for several months 
exceeded the lombard rate, indicating strict quantity rationing even with respect to 
the emergency-lending facility. After the collapse of Bretton Woods, foreign securi-
ties no longer represented liquid assets, and the Bundesbank succeeded to bring 
down banks' excess liquid balances nearly to zero.  
− The next monetary restriction in the early 1980s, prompted by the aim to defend the 
internal and external value of the mark, was accompanied by substantial sales of 
currency reserves that implied concomitant liquidity losses in the German banking 
sector. These losses provided a convenient background for decisions on interest rate 
increases. The Bundesbank also stopped ordinary lombard borrowing, which was 
substituted by an ,extra‘ lombard facility at even higher rates; money market rates 
thus were kept inside the corridor. 
                                                 
4  The monetary restriction in the early 1990s is neglected here because of the intricate 
money supply effects accompanying the German currency union.  
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In all three periods, we can observe a fairly similar working of a monetary transmis-
sion process. The volume of bank credit, if plotted against credit interest rates, shows an 
anti-clockwise movement (Figure 2). The extension of bank loans is reduced along with 
rising interest rates; this pattern, if read with an analytical credit market diagram in 
mind, hints to a reduction of banks' credit supply (shift of the supply curve to the left), 
whereas in the depth of the recession, credit volumes shrink with decreasing interest 
rates (which shows a downward shift of the credit demand curve). Summarizing the 
evidence on the Bundesbank's way of controlling the money market, we find that quan-
tity restrictions in the money market were applied, if feasible and necessary, in a con-
trolled and smoothed way. The remarkable success of this type of liquidity management 
can be seen in the fact that narrow money and bank credit aggregates reacted in a sys-
tematic fashion to the course of the Bundesbank's interest rate policy. 
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Figure 2: Credit market cycles: new bank loans (including securities) to pri-
vate non-banks (DM bill.) and bank-credit interest rates in Ger-
many 
4. Independence of Interest Rates and Base Money Supply in EMU 
For well understood reasons, the ECB tried to avoid the impression that the quantity 
of high-powered money was a demand-determined variable. Even when operating in the 
fixed-rate modus of its repo tender policies, the ECB most of the time fixed a maximum 
volume of refinancing credit that was extended to the commercial banking sector.5 This 
limitation was binding: during the first two years since its inception, commercial banks' 
bids exceeded the ECB's allotment of base money to a vast extent; the allotment-bid ra-
tio finally, in summer 2000, fell below 1% (Figure 3). But overbidding in no way was 
caused by a liquidity shortage, it rested on the speculation of imminent policy rate in-
creases that induced commercial banks to stock up on cheap reserves. After switching to 
variable-rate tender allotment, ratios normalized at around 80%, and their volatility fur-
                                                 
5  In the following, the years 2008-10 are neglected in order not to mix up the peculiarities 
of ,normal‘ monetary policy making with the financial-market turmoil of the subprime 
crisis and its aftermath. 
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ther diminished when in March 2004 the duration of repo transactions was shortened to 
one week, thereby doubling their volume (ECB 2008b).  
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Figure 3: Commercial banks' bids and base money allotment (€ bill.) in 
ECB's main refinancing operations 
Over the period 1999-2007, the ECB improved its liquidity management in a sub-
stantial way, marginal lending and deposit facilities were taken up less and less. This 
can be seen from an inspection of the interest rate corridor, where the borderlines are 
given by a ,penalty‘ lending rate and the deposit rate. The overnight interest rate 
(EONIA), as the price-theoretic gauge of supply-demand imbalances in the interbank 
money market, diverges from the ECB's main refinancing rate, but this volatility dimin-
ishes after 2003 (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Interest rate corridor in EMU 
Central bank balances were used, more or less completely, for keeping accounts with 
the ECB and distributing notes to the non-bank public (Figure 5). Taking account for 
the fact that note distribution did not begun before 2002, both components of base 
money developed quite evenly thereafter, with the growth rate of note circulation de-
creasing steadily over the years and the growth rate of central bank accounts (reflecting 
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mainly minimum-reserve requirements) tracking the volatility of commercial banks' 
business. Apparently, the dynamics of this business seems to be unaffected from the in-
terest hike starting in late 2005. 
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Figure 5: Use of central bank money in EMU (€ bill., growth rates) 
The bids-allotment ratio can be interpreted as a rough quantitative measure of liquid-
ity strain in the money market; the stronger liquidity needs are felt in the banking sector, 
the more the ratio can be expected to increase. However there is hardly any perceptible 
connection between the course of interest policy and the quantity signal of money mar-
ket imbalances (Figure 6). Within the full cycle from one interest rate peak to the next, 
one might expect a fainting excess demand when interest policy turns expansive, and an 
ever more visible excess demand when interest rates are on the rise; but the bids-
allotment ratio, particularly after the shortening of repo credits' duration in 2004, stays 
around a value of 1.2. 
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3.1.01 31.12.02 30.12.04 28.12.06
1,5
2,5
3,5
4,5
5,5
bids-allotment
ratio (left)
EONIA
min bid rate
 
Figure 6: Excess demand for base money, EMU overnight interest rate and 
ECB's stipulated minimum-bid interest rates for repo transactions 
The tendency of enduring equilibrium in terms of money supply and demand can 
also be read off from the close match between the market and the target rate of interest 
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over the whole period. Differences between these rates measure relative scarcity or 
abundance of money balances, given a policy stance of the ECB, but they do not reflect 
the overall sign of that policy stance. It is remarkable that during the series of interest 
rate increases since the end of 2005, there was obviously no growing scarcity of high-
powered money; Figure 5 shows that the stock of base money (notes and accounts) re-
mained on a steady path, with an accelerating growth rate of central bank accounts. De-
spite switching to a restrictive course of interest rate policies, the ECB was accommo-
dating in quantity terms; the behaviour of balances' growth rate was procyclical.  
Nevertheless, the spread of EONIA vis-à-vis the ECB's target rate is generally posi-
tive, which might be interpreted as the result of a liquidity deficit. In order to judge this 
argument we have to look more closely into the ECB's money market operations. In 
American-type repo auctions, banks are invited to place individual bids where final 
transactions are settled by using the individual bank's offered interest rate. Banks may 
place multiple offers at different interest rates, making the aggregated money demand 
function L look like a downward heading flight of stairs (Figure 7). The ECB announces 
a minimum bid rate mini , but financial-market agents only conjecture about the final ag-
gregate allotment M that the ECB calculates from data on (mainly) minimum-reserve 
requirements and note circulation. 
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Figure 7: ECB's variable-rate tender auction with staggered money demand 
(multiple bids) and fixed allotment of base money 
A bank may choose mini  as its individual interest offer, but runs the risk that with too 
many competitors pursuing the same strategy the allotment is rationed among all so that 
individual liquidity needs are not met. The aim to avoid that risk makes the demand 
curve steeper. „Banks insure themselves by bidding at higher rates to avoid unexpected 
rationing“ (Linzert and Schmidt 2008, p. 13). The demand curve can also shift upwards 
resulting in an intersection of L and M above the mini line. This market equilibrium de-
termines the effective marginal bid rate margi . As each banks pays its own offered rate 
there is also an average bid rate averi , which necessarily lies above mini .  
The ECB's former practice of two-week overlapping tender operations helped to 
smoothen the banks' bid behaviour, as a bank that found itself excluded from a present 
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repo transaction still disposed of the liquidity borrowed in the last transaction. The 
changeover to one-week repo transactions in March 2004 increased perceived liquidity 
risks on the part of banks.6 This can be seen from the spread building up between the 
marginal and the minimum bid rate during 2004 (Figure 8). Since then, the spread re-
mained at around 5 bp in ,normal‘ times. Whereas the spread aver margi i−  is evident by 
construction, the spread between the EONIA and the average bid rate can be explained 
by the fact EONIA is the price for unsecured interbank lending whereas the ECB's refi-
nancing credits are subject to collateral requirements. The usual interest-rate structure 
thus is aver marg minEONIA i i i> > > .7   
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Figure 8: Spreads of EMU overnight rate, average and marginal repo rates as 
against minimum bid rate (basis points) 
The upshot of all this is that the various spreads with respect to the minimum bid rate 
should not be seen as reflecting a deliberate policy of shortening the money supply. 
Rather these spreads are caused by structural features of the EMU money market and 
the techniques of liquidity provision. The series of interest rate increases that started in 
December 2005 basically had no bearing on the structure of these short-term rates. 
True, there is no target for base money in EMU. But the accommodating behaviour 
of monetary policy with respect to the supply of narrow money obviously also had re-
                                                 
6  „Prior to March 2004, when liquidity was obtained by overlapping two-week operations, 
banks always enjoyed a ,liquidity buffer‘ provided by their allotment in the previous 
week. Being denied this buffer, concerns about receiving an allotment of desired size in 
each operation may have risen. Therefore, banks may dislike the uncertainty surrounding 
their allotment, and consequently bid more aggressively, i.e. placing bids above the ex-
pected marginal rate to increase the certainty of their pro-rata allotment. If many banks 
follow this strategy, an upward trend in the tender spread could become self-sustaining“ 
(Linzert and Schmidt 2008, p. 13). 
7  In the second half of 2007, the beginning financial-market turmoil manifests itself in a 
larger spread, indicating a stronger ,ex ante‘ liquidity preference on the part of commer-
cial banks. At the same time however, the negative bias of the (very volatile) EONIA 
spread shows that banks felt to dispose of excess liquidity after borrowing from the ECB, 
which accordingly was invested in the money market. Later, after the fall of Lehman, the-
se funds were reinvested in the ECB's deposit facility. 
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percussions on business conditions in the banking sector at large, on the growth of 
credit and of broader monetary aggregates. Despite structural breaks and evolution in 
the still developing monetary union, base money (M0) and broader monetary aggregates 
(M1 and M3) show rather close relationships (Figure 9). Just as the ECB lets the quan-
tity of base money supply adjust to the commercial banks' needs, it accepts the path of 
broad money up to each point of time, when a refinancing operation is executed, as 
given. The evident non-controllability of M3, which hardly ever kept to its desired 
growth rate of 4.5%, appears to be rooted in the mechanisms and working techniques of 
the money market. 
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Figure 9: Growth of M3 and of EMU banks' credit to private non-banks, ra-
tio of M3 and M1 to base money (M0) 
The quantity of base money is no policy tool, neither is broad money. These aggre-
gates are endogenously determined by activities in the banking sector, particularly by 
the path of credit growth. Monetary policy relies only on the relative-price effect that is 
triggered by a change of short-term interest rates: Δ → Δ → Δ → Δi credit M3 base  
money (Disyatat 2008). The ECB adjusts base money supply not before its previous in-
terest rate impulses have succeeded to alter the path of commercial banks' credits and 
deposits. However, the recent experience of a continuing increase of credits and depos-
its despite a series of restrictive interest rate moves since December 2005 (Figure 9) 
raises some doubts whether this instrument alone is always sufficient to control activi-
ties in the banking sector. Credit growth flattened out after a while, but M3 growth re-
sumed. Obviously, EMU banks, in times of monetary restriction, feel hardly any liquid-
ity stress in quantitative terms.  
A striking difference to the above-sketched Bundesbank regime is the pattern of 
prices and quantities on the credit market (Figures 2 and 10). It has been argued above 
that a north-western movement of the market equilibrium point in times of a monetary 
restriction can be understood as a shift of the credit supply curve that in turn signals a 
fundamental reaction of the banking sector with respect to the policy stance of the cen-
tral bank (ECB 2009b). This type of market behaviour cannot be observed after 2000. 
Particularly after 2005, loan supply simply follows a series of expansive credit demand 
shifts (the same pattern of market behaviour can be observed in the US already since the 
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1990s where the volume of new loans grew along with rising bank-credit interest rates 
and - not shown in Figure 11 - rising Federal Funds rates). ECB interest rate policies for 
a long time were not able to stop credit market dynamics. One may argue that a continu-
ing credit market dynamic in spite of a monetary restriction simply means that interest 
rate increases were too moderate. But the key point is: restrictive interest rate policies 
combined with quantitative base money rationing convey a qualitatively different, i.e. 
stronger signal to the commercial banking system than any other series of interest rate 
increases, however strong.  
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Figure 10: Credit market cycles: new bank loans (including securities) to pri-
vate non-banks (€ bill.) and bank-credit interest rates in EMU 
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Figure 11: Credit market cycles: new bank loans to private non-banks ($ bill.) 
and bank-credit interest rates in US 
5. Organizing the Money Market as a Floor System 
The preceding Sections intended to argue that modern financial markets' proneness 
to excessive credit growth and asset price bubbles is the consequence of a missing quan-
titative liquidity constraint imposed on the banking system. Rising central bank interest 
rates in a regime of monetary restriction hence give the commercial banks' credit supply 
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function a positive slope, which indicates that increased costs of liquidity provision is 
passed on to the banks' clients, but fail to stop credit market dynamics if the outlook on 
asset and/or goods market still looks prosperous and financial markets are liquid. It fol-
lows that ordinary interest rate policies (e.g., obeying a Taylor Rule) will suffice to sta-
bilize macro cycles with moderate inflation, but ought to be supplemented by additional 
quantitative money supply measures if inflationary expectations are no longer anchored 
or in a case of true asset inflation.8  
The key question now is: does the quantity of high-powered money represent an ad-
ditional policy tool besides the central bank rate of interest? Until a decade ago, the an-
swer would have been an unequivocal ,no‘. Poole (1970) had clarified the case when 
monetary policy ought to fix the (long-term) interest rate, and not the quantity of 
money; later Goodhart promoted the view that monetary policy operations in general 
were executed in terms of interest rate setting instead of controlling monetary aggre-
gates, „though, of course, one is the dual of the other“ (1989, p. 293). But then Wood-
ford (2000) demonstrated that interest rate policies would work even in a cashless soci-
ety, which implied that the management of monetary aggregates might be used for addi-
tional control purposes in a standard economy with a positive money demand.  
The ensuing debate on various ways to organize the money market, including the 
question of paying interest on central bank accounts, confirmed the two-instruments 
view in the case of a ,floor system‘: here the central bank stands ready to supply base 
money M on demand at the chosen target interest rate i∗ , which at the same time is the 
yield paid on (voluntary and mandatory) accounts with the central bank. This deposit 
rate puts a floor to the market rate of interest as no commercial bank will lend money to 
other financial-market agents at lower rates than i∗  if excess funds can be placed at the 
central bank. As a consequence, the commercial banks' interest-elastic money demand 
function L is kinked at point A. At the right of A, the money market absorbs any ,ex-
cess‘ amount of base money (AB in Figure 12) because these funds find their way back 
to the central bank's deposit account. This enables the central bank to vary the amount 
of base money by way of open-market transactions in long-term or high-risk paper, 
thereby offering ,liquidity services‘ to financial markets (Goodfriend 2002; Disyatat 
2008; Keister et al. 2008). 
                                                 
8  An example for the first case is the period of high inflation and dollar depreciation at the 
end of the 1970s, which called for a regime shift in monetary policy. The former presi-
dent of the Bundesbank Emminger claimed to have contributed to a ,monetarist conver-
sion‘ of the new Fed chairman Volcker at a high-level meeting in Hamburg: „During the 
discussion of the Fed's power to strengthen the dollar, Volcker asked: Do you think that 
US interest rates are not high enough? [...] I intervened and reported to have heard from 
US business representatives times and again that, though finance may be costly, it is still 
easily available. Leading American bankers had declared not to feel bothered by high in-
terest rates as long as they know that refinancing is not restricted; high rates simply would 
be passed on to their clients. I added that in the current inflationary atmosphere it is not 
interest rates that is important, but the quantity of money provided by the central bank. 
Now something unexpected happened: Volcker agreed at once and repeated: Yes, the 
truly decisive variable is the quantity of money“ (Emminger 1986, pp. 396-7, my transla-
tion). 
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Basically, this is a liquidity trap scenario, just right to depict current quantitative-
easing policies of some central banks. Apart from the zero-bound problem, monetary 
policy is free to vary the target interest rate and the quantity of high-powered money in-
dependently from each other. The obvious advantage of this strategy is that the central 
bank can use two instruments;  its operations have an impact on both money and capital 
markets, and thus the term structure of interest rates, if short-term repo transactions with 
the banking system are supplemented by open-market sales or purchases of long-term 
securities. However, two points might raise concern: 
L
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Figure 12: ,Floor‘ money market with target = deposit rate 
− If the central bank executes open-market transactions on a large scale, it has to be 
equipped with a sizeable stock of long-term paper, presumably government bonds, 
which creates an unwanted interdependence between monetary and fiscal policy 
that might impede the political autonomy of monetary authorities.  
− If the central bank offers the cheapest admission to base money via unlimited (repo) 
borrowing at the target rate, the interbank money market ceases to play an important 
role. Currently, in the ECB corridor system (Whitesell 2006; ECB 2008b), varia-
tions of the money-market rate vis-à-vis the target rate in both directions provide in-
formation on the state of the market. In the floor system, the money market rate 
practically will not diverge from the target rate. 
6. The Proposal: A Budget Constraint for Asset Markets 
The basic question however is the efficiency of the floor system in the case of a 
monetary restriction. A macroeconomic expansion typically is accompanied, and driven, 
by credit growth that also leads to an increased money demand on the part of commer-
cial banks; assume a stylized scenario where the money demand function has shifted 
from 0L  to 1L  and the target interest rate is increased from 0i
∗  to 1i
∗  (Figure 13). There 
are several options for the course of monetary policy: 
− Money supply is kept at 0M , letting the money market settle at point C. This indi-
cates that the financial market stays as (overly) liquid as before. Monetary policy 
only relies on the relative-price effect of (slowly) rising interest rates.  
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− More in line with the aim of slowing down macro dynamics is a reduction of money 
supply to 1M , with a money-market equilibrium at D. Here, the central bank still 
supplies base money on demand of commercial banks, but abstains from injecting 
additional funds into the market. The downward adjustment 0 1M M→ , by selling 
long-term paper, is likely to support the transmission of higher interest rates from 
the money to the capital market.  
− The last and more radical option is to trigger a liquidity squeeze by 0 2M M→ . At 
the new target interest rate 1i
∗ , money demand exceeds money supply, which acti-
vates the interbank money market and leads to an equilibrium in E. Here the market 
interest rate exceeds the target rate, and the long-term interest rate presumably will 
also rise. 
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Figure 13: Monetary restriction in a floor system 
Obviously, the last-mentioned option will be most effective to stop an severe infla-
tionary process on goods and/or asset markets. One basic drawback is that it violates the 
modern norm of monetary policy making, i.e. to adjust base money supply to the needs 
of the banking system in order to guarantee a smooth working of financial markets. A 
policy of shortening the money supply thus also undermines the information function of 
the target rate, which no longer serves as an attractor of market yields. This causes a 
,signalling‘ problem: either the central bank is considered as being unable to realize the 
target rate that it has communicated to the public, or it might be reproached for deviat-
ing from the announced target. However, a massive reduction of base money that causes 
a gap between the effective and the target interest is no part of the regular way of policy 
making; central banks will recur to this measure on rare occasions only. Here, an an-
nouncement that the scissors strategy might cause money market rates to rise beyond 
the target rate will even emphasize the central bank's determination to bring (asset 
and/or goods) prices back on track.  
A further fundamental objection to the scissors strategy is that, although it comprises 
two instruments that in fact to some degree are independent, it is questionable whether 
these instruments can really be directed towards two different goals, namely to stabilize 
goods and asset prices. It is evident that transmission processes from both instruments 
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to the two types of inflation cannot be strictly separated; at best it is a question of a 
gradually differentiated assignment. A liquidity shortage imposed directly upon the 
banking system most probably will have its strongest impact on loan supply. But there 
is hardly any clue as to whether banks, when perceiving liquidity pressure, will cut back 
lending for purchasing financial assets more than lending for acquisitions in the real 
sector, and both parts of these credits cannot easily be assigned to speculative and non-
speculative purposes.  
Thus it cannot be avoided that a fully-fledged monetary restriction that comprises 
higher interest rates and a constrained money supply will affect both goods and asset 
markets. A more differentiating policy can only be achieved by additional signalling ef-
fects of central bank communication. One of the main reasons for excessive credit 
growth and asset price bubbles is the commercial banks' expectation that monetary pol-
icy will refrain from any restriction as long as goods price inflation remains within the 
target range (Borio and Lowe 2002). It is therefore indispensable to extend the central 
banks' mission: they ought to be obliged to take measures against the build-up of bub-
bles, so that banks perceive a higher risk if the monetary authority declares to be con-
cerned about rising asset prices.  
The Two Pillars of the ECB now appear as if ideally constructed for a dual target, 
and the Monetary Pillar should be assigned to the diagnosis and therapy of financial-
market instability. Whereas De Grauwe and Gros (2009) suggest to proceed to discre-
tionary variation of minimum-reserve requirements, the preferred instrument of this pa-
per's proposal are purchases and sales of long-term bonds, activated in times of need, 
which have to be announced in public in order to send appropriate signals to financial-
market agents. These open-market policies can be initially applied even without varying 
the rates stipulated for short-term refinancing operations.  
This leaves the most troublesome part of this paper's suggestion: how to identify a 
bubble? It is difficult, but not impossible. Borio and Lowe (2002) present an aggregate 
asset price indicator (consisting of equities, residential and commercial real estate) that 
proves to be fairly useful in predicting financial imbalances. The most convincing ar-
gument for preserving the ECB's Monetary Pillar was that broad money growth could 
be used as an indicator for asset price bubbles (Issing 2005). Excessive growth of bank 
credit and monetary aggregates, measured as long-run ratios against GDP, provide a re-
liable early-warning sign for asset market bubbles (Alessi and Detken 2008; Gerdes-
meier 2009). Further research might improve the ability to forecast speculative manias. 
But, of course, eventually financial-market stability is a fuzzy goal of economic policy 
like others.9  
Putting the focus on the detection and containment of bubbles is important but may 
still miss the key point: the repeated emergence of (at least ex post) obvious imbalances 
on various asset markets can be understood as a manifestation of an ,overbanking‘ trend 
on a large scale. The metaphor of a ,decoupling‘ of the financial sector from the sphere 
                                                 
9  Alluding to the days when full employment was a policy goal, Blinder (1988, p. 3) sug-
gested a pragmatic view on another identification issue: „Involuntary unemployment is 
like pornography: it's hard to define, but you know it when you see it.“ 
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of the ,real‘ economy has been a key topic in heterodox camps of economists and non-
economists for quite some time, but remained largely neglected in mainstream econom-
ics (Menkhoff and Tolksdorf 2001). The world financial crisis of 2007-? let the saying of 
,casino capitalism‘ gain more widespread acknowledgement. Even a cursory view on 
the development of gross lending in the commercial banking sector shows that, already 
since decades, financial transactions appear to outpace more and more the volume of 
production activities (Figures 14 and 15). 
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Figure 14: Dynamics and structure of bank lending in Germany, compared to 
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Figure 15: Dynamics and structure of bank lending in EMU, compared to no-
minal GDP (same keys as in Figure 14) 
A closer inspection reveals that gross credit growth stepped up after 1990, where the 
world economy entered a new era, and that loans to foreign banks and non-banks gained 
18  Peter Spahn 
 
increasing shares in overall credit supply.10 Internationalization of banking and working 
with high leverage ratios turned out to be key elements in the process of creating and 
disseminating ,toxic‘ assets. Low central bank interest rates during some years have 
been named as one cause of the piling-up of asset prices; but unrestricted access to cen-
tral bank balances prevailed over the whole period. Securitization, which reduced the 
banks' funding needs in event of monetary tightening, further contributed to the banks' 
perception that liquidity is no limiting factor (Altunbas 2007).  
The eruption of the financial crisis let banks realize that liquidity is an endogenous 
variable that besides the behaviour of the central bank also depends on the liquidity 
preference on the part of market agents.11 One important monetary policy lesson that 
was deduced from the crisis is that central banks should monitor and react to commer-
cial banks' leverage (Adrian and Shin 2009b). Also the revision of the modern dogma of 
demand-determined base money supply might help to deter commercial banks from the 
belief that ever-growing credit extention particular to the financial sector can be main-
tained without micro and macro risk.  
7. Conclusions 
Modern central banking has learnt to stabilize goods demand by interest rate policies 
and to anchor inflation expectations by building credibility via competence and political 
independence. Goods market inflation is under control, in principle, but asset price in-
flation is not. Whereas goods prices are relatively sticky, being determined by slowly 
changing production costs, asset prices are both more flexible, because of asset trading 
in stock markets with high-speed price adjustment, and less determined, because of un-
certain or multiple fundamental equilibria, speculation and herding. If then ample credit 
is easily available, the emergence of bubbles appears to be inescapable.  
Quantitative constraints in the provision of liquidity in the banking system have been 
abolished by moving to fiat-money systems, and by adopting ever more sophisticated 
money-market control techniques, where any non-price money demand rationing creates 
inefficient noise. It is a ,fair-weather‘ strategy, nevertheless, that relies only on small-
step (expected) interest changes. Their immediate effect is to steepen the banks' credit-
supply curve, but the volume of loans continues to grow as long as the cumulative im-
pact of past and expected interest moves induces a new risk assessment on the part of 
commercial banks and their clients, which makes credit supply and demand functions 
shift to the left. In a normal business cycle, this may suffice to achieve macro stabiliza-
tion before inflation reaches double digits. However, profit expectations on asset mar-
kets can be different in dimension; therefore, the lags involved in modern interest rate 
policies are too long so that bubbles already might have grown to an extent that leaves a 
crash as the only way of correction.  
                                                 
10  For a longer-term view on this issue see Schularik and Taylor (2009).   
11  „The language of ,liquidity‘ suggests a stock of available funding in the financial system 
which is redistributed as needed. However, when liquidity dries up, it disappears alto-
gether rather than being reallocated elsewhere“ (Adrian and Shin 2009a, p. 603). 
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If the money market is organized as a floor system, interest rates and base money can 
be varied - to some extent - independently. It is suggested to use money supply man-
agement as a separate tool assigned to the aim of financial-market stability. The effi-
ciency of this instrument can be expected to stem from two aspects: 
− the announcement effect, which signals to market agents that the central bank is de-
termined to stop asset price bubbles from growing beyond reasonable limits, and 
thus cushions price dynamics because of higher risk; 
− the liquidity effect, which forces banks to restrict credit growth, sell assets and thus 
contribute to increases of long-term rates of interest. 
Re-inventing money as a policy tool is not meant to indicate a return to monetarist 
theories and concepts that were propagated to control goods market inflation. Rather, it 
is an attempt to establish a kind of a ,budget constraint‘ on asset markets that probably 
cannot be put up by interest rate policies alone. 
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